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Global Aging and Fiscal Policy with International Labor Mobility: 
A Political Economy Perspective
*
 
This paper uses an overlapping generations model with international labor mobility and a 
politically responsive fiscal policy to examine aging in developed and developing regions. 
Migrant workers change the political structure composed of young and elderly voters in both 
labor-receiving and labor-sending countries. Numerical simulations show that the developed 
region benefits more from international labor mobility through the contribution of migrant 
workers as laborers, savers, and voters. The developing region experiences significant 
growth in all specifications but benefit more under international capital mobility. Restricting 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
  Population aging has become a global phenomenon. Population projections show that 
the world median age will rise from 26.4 in 2000 to 36.8 in 2050 (United Nations, 2002a). 
While recent focus has been on population aging in developed countries, developing 
countries are not far from the aging trend. The United Nations projections indicate that old-
age dependency ratios
2 in developed and developing regions will increase approximately by 
4 percent and 70 percent between 2050 and 2100, respectively. By 2150, the difference 
between the old-age dependency ratios of the two regions will be quite small
3. Thus, 
population aging is not confined to developed countries; sooner or later populations of all 
nations will age. Heller (2003, pp.13) gives a striking example by noting that the share of the 
elderly population in the United Arab Emirates is expected to rise from 2 percent to 28 
percent by 2050. 
 
An important consequence of population aging is increasing fiscal pressure through 
higher government spending on social security, health care and other welfare programs for 
the elderly.
4 This may mean lower government spending for other programs that primarily 
benefit the young. The link between increasing political power of the elderly and government 
spending on such programs as education has been examined by Gradstein and Kaganovich 
(2003), Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2004), and Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002). Since 
education is a major input to human capital accumulation, aging is expected to have 
significant growth consequences. Aging has also been analyzed in open economy by Cutler, 
et al. (1990), Börsch-Supan (1996), Kenc and Sayan (2001), Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000), 
Jelassi and Sayan (2004), Tosun (2001, 2003 and 2008), and Van Groezen and Leers (2000). 
This literature shows the significance of the international spillover effects of aging. While 
there is a growing literature analyzing the link between population aging and international 
capital mobility, only few studies examined aging with labor migration (Leers, Meijdam, and 
Verbon, 2004; Storesletten, 2000). In a dynamic model with international capital mobility 
only, wage rates do not necessarily equalize between countries in all periods of their 
transition to the long run steady state. This implies that, when allowed, labor will move to the 
country with the higher standard of living. This highlights the need for an analysis of aging in 
an open economy framework with international labor mobility. Galor (1992) argued that 
capital and labor have asymmetric characteristics. Labor mobility has a dual effect in the 
sense that it exhibits the characteristics of capital mobility as well. Young migrant workers 
contribute to the economy both as laborers, and as savers. What the aging literature has not 
                                                 
2Old-age dependency ratio is the proportion of population aged 65 and older to population 
aged 15 to 64. 
3 A medium fertility scenario shows that in 2150 the old-age dependency ratios will be 0.47 
and 0.43 for the developed and developing regions, respectively. 
4 See Heller (2003) and CSIS (2002) for recent discussions on the fiscal implications of 
global aging. 
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addressed is that, when allowed to vote, migrant workers will change the political structure 
composed of young and elderly voters in both labor-receiving and labor-sending countries. In 
a majority voting mechanism for fiscal policy decisions, political shifts resulting from labor 
migration may have sizeable impacts on government programs, and in turn may have strong 
growth effects. This paper uses a two-region, two-period overlapping generations model with 
international labor mobility and a politically responsive fiscal policy to examine the growth 
effects of the aging trend in developed and developing countries. The paper contributes to the 
literature on the economic effects of population aging in two major ways. First, it brings out 
the political economy of aging through the aging-education-human capital link. The paper 
argues that this is particularly important in the context of international labor mobility with 
young migrant workers participating in the political system of developed countries. Second, 
the paper examines the significance of factor mobility as a policy choice by comparing the 
labor mobility model to an alternative open economy model with international capital 
mobility. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives a description of a two-
region, two-period overlapping generations model with international labor mobility. This is 
followed by a transition analysis in section 3 that shows results from various numerical 
simulation exercises. The last section presents summary and concluding remarks. 
 
II.   THE TWO-REGION MODEL 
The model builds on a two-period overlapping generations model first developed by 
Diamond (1965)
5. To examine open economy issues, the standard framework is extended to 
a two-region model with international labor mobility similar to Galor (1986, 1992) and 
Crettez et al. (1996, 1998)
6. Another major extension is the modeling of fiscal policy 
decision-making through a political process. 
                                                
 
Recent discussions on population aging have noted the potential generational conflict 
generated by the need to share society’s resources between non-working elderly and the 
younger working population. It is argued that increasing number of elderly voters could 
render changes in public expenditure patterns in favor of the elderly. This, in turn, could 
trigger serious generational conflict regarding government programs that enhances the 
productivity of the working young. One good example to this is government spending on 
public education. For simplicity, the productivity enhancing public program will be referred 
to as “education” throughout the text.
7 The goal is to highlight the strong link between this 
 
5 However, the earliest overlapping generations models are described by Allais (1947) and 
Samuelson (1958). Children are not modeled in a two-period model. 
6 A two-country model with international capital mobility is shown by Buiter (1981). 
7 It should be noted that any other government program that is directed towards increasing 
the labor productivity of young could easily be used. 
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type of government spending and human capital accumulation, which is considered to be one 
of the most important avenues for economic growth.   
 
Empirical studies, particularly from the U.S., show the significance of the political 
economy consideration of the relationship between population aging and education spending. 
Among the earlier studies, Button (1992) suggests that generational conflict is quite apparent 
on education issues by examining the voting behavior of the elderly in tax referenda in six 
Florida counties. Deller and Walzer (1993) found weaker evidence of such generational 
conflict based on a survey of residents in rural Illinois. Poterba (1997) provided empirical 
evidence using state-level data that older citizens prefer lower levels of public spending for 
education, an expenditure that primarily benefits the young. A recent study by Harris, Evans, 
and Schwab (2001) confirmed this finding using school-district-level data, however with a 
smaller estimated impact than Poterba’s estimates. While, the 2004 AARP Aging American 
Voter Survey indicates that a majority of older people support federal government’s 
responsibility in educating young people, the same survey shows that a large group of older 




Given the expected future aging trends in both developed and developing countries, 
generational conflict in education spending could become even more prevalent. Modeling 
generational conflict in education is also important when we consider immigration. Table 1 
provides basic statistics on immigration and education spending. This shows that high-
income (developed) countries that had positive net migration rates between 1995 and 2000 
indeed had both higher average education spending per capita and higher percentage increase 
in education spending per capita in this period compared to both less developed regions and 
least developed countries. Among these developed countries, the ones with the highest net 
migration rate also had significantly higher increase in education spending than the ones with 
the lowest net migration rate. Hence, aging-education link may provide useful insight in a 
study on population aging and international labor mobility. To make the political process of 
fiscal policy determination for public education rich, interesting, yet tractable, a median-voter 
framework with voter heterogeneity is used. Voter heterogeneity is introduced by assuming a 
distribution of genetic ability levels for the working generation. The ability level of the 
individual will, in turn, determine the value she receives from public education. While the 
emphasis of the paper is political economy of education spending, a social security program 
is also introduced by having an exogenously fixed level of social security spending in the 
model. An income tax that is earmarked for social security adjusts through the periods to 
balance the social security budget. Thus, there are separate taxes for education and social 
security spending with voters deciding only on the education tax rate.
9 For clarity, the model 
                                                 
(continued…) 
8 See AARP (2004) for a summary of findings from this survey. 
9The political process is modeled through a median voter framework because the conditions 
for the median voter theorem are satisfied. The choice of voters is over a single dimension 
since the preferred education tax rate is the only choice variable, and the voter preferences 
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is presented for one region only. This is followed by a description of the two-region world 
equilibrium.   
 
A.   Households 
  Individuals live for two periods and seek to maximize a utility function based on 






jt jt UC C 
    
  (1) 
 
here j indexes individuals,   is consumption when young,   is consumption when old, 
and   is the pure rate of time preference. The period-specific budget constraints in the first 
and the second periods are: 
jt C 1  jt C
 
First period:        1 jt j jt j t t t t j Ca Sa w l a        
Second Period:         11 1 1 11 ,   jt j t t t jt j Ca r S a        (2) 
 
where   is first period saving,   is the wage rate individual j faces,   is 
effective labor,
 jt j Sa t w  tj la
10 where   is the ability level of individual j,  1 j a t r  is the rate of return to 
capital,  t   is the rate of income taxation that is applied to both capital and labor income.  
This tax is used entirely to finance education spending. An additional tax ( t  ) is also applied 
to capital and labor income to finance social security spending by the government. 
 
It is assumed that there is a continuous distribution of abilities that is replicated in 
each new generation. The ability level of individual j is indexed by  , which ranges from 0 






1 . fa d a      (3) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
are single peaked. The property of single-peakedness has been demonstrated to ensure 
existence of a voting equilibrium (Black 1948). 
10Here, young supplies one unit of time to the economy. Note that, making the allocation of 
time between “schooling” and supplying labor endogenous does not change this analysis.  
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Human capital is accumulated from the interaction of ability level ( ) of the individual and 







tj j t la a g

     (4) 
 
where,  denotes an index on human capital efficiency and   is a parameter indicating the 
return to human capital from the inputs (  and  ). j a
e
t g
11 The form of the human capital 
function is chosen so that even individuals with the lowest ability (0 j a )   will contribute to 
the economy in terms of human capital (see Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun 2004). From the 
maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (4); we get the familiar first order condition: 
 













   
 (5) 
 










Saving of an individual depends on net labor earnings but it is independent of the interest 
rate. This is due to the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function.  Given (5) and (6), it is 
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11  should be less than or equal to unity to prevent increasing returns from government 
spending.  
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B.   Political Process of Fiscal Policy 
It is assumed that there is a predetermined level of social security spending. Thus the 
social security tax  t   is simply determined by the government budget constraint (
s
tt t y g   ) 
where 
s
t g  is the social security spending per young person.
12   
 
However, the fiscal policy for education is determined through a political process for 
which a median-voter framework with voter heterogeneity is used. Voter heterogeneity is 
introduced by assuming a uniform distribution of genetic ability levels for the working 
generation. The ability level of the individual will, in turn, determine the value she receives 
from the public good. 
 
  The consumption and saving decisions, as seen above, depend on human capital, 
which is in turn determined by government spending (see equation 4). By plugging these 
into (1), we get the indirect utility function, which each voter maximizes, in determining his 
or her preferred tax rate, subject to the government budget constraint for this type of 
government spending( )
e
tt t y g  .



















Equation (8) is the tax rate each individual prefers based on her ability level. This preferred 
tax rate is increasing in both ability level   and in income per young  j a t y  but decreasing in 
the social security tax t  . Thus, the existence of a social security system depresses education 
spending through a lower preferred education tax rate. In addition, because the old do not 
derive any benefit from publicly provided education and there are no bequests in the model, 
they incur a cost without enjoying any benefits. Therefore, their preferred education tax rate 
will always be zero, regardless of their ability.  
 
Total population in each period is  t t N N  1  where Nt is composed of both newly 
born nationals and migrant workers. Given this, the median voter is defined by 
                                                 
12 Social security spending consists of equal payments to elderly population to finance a 
programmed elderly consumption such as health care. This consumption is assumed to be 
separate from the discretionary consumption decision and therefore it is not shown as part of 
households’ utility maximization depicted in equations (1) through (7).  
13 It is assumed in each period that government uses the entire revenue from this tax to 
finance the public good for all young equally, regardless of their ability level (Bearse, 
Glomm, and Ravikumar 2000). 
















t  (9) 
 
here am is the ability level of the median voter.  
 
In the absence of migration, the median voter becomes a person with lower ability 
when population ages. In turn, the preferred tax rate of the median voter is lower. In other 
words, with population aging older people need fewer young voters to form a majority. Since 
these young voters are the ones at the lower end of the ability distribution, they prefer lower 
taxes than higher ability people because their return from public education is lower.  
 
When labor migration is allowed, an aging country will experience an inflow of labor 
due to a higher wage rate than the rest of the world. This will change the age distribution of 
population in favor of the young generation. The identity of the median voter will be 
different from the case without migration (see Appendix I). Now, the ability of the median 
voter will be higher compared to median voter’s ability in the case without migration. 
However, whether the ability of median voter with migration can be greater than the pre-
aging level is uncertain
14. 
  
C.   Producers 
  Each country produces a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production technology. 
 
1  , tt t YK H
    (10) 
 
here   is the productivity index,   K  is capital stock and H  is aggregate supply of human 





. tt HN l a f a d a    (11) 
 
Human capital per worker, using (4) and (11), is 
 
   (12)    
1
0
1 tt ha g f a
    . d a
                                                
 
Competitive factor markets require that real wage and interest rates are equal to the marginal 
products of labor and capital respectively. Therefore, factor demand equations are: 
 
14 In reality, there are barriers to labor migration that may rule out such a case. 
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Here,   are capital stock per worker and human capital 
per worker, respectively.  
/ and / tt t tt kK N hH N  t
 
  Using (6) and (12), saving per worker can be expressed as 
 






tt t t t s w ag f a da
            .  (15) 
 
D.   International Goods Market Equilibrium and Labor Flows  
  In the absence of international capital mobility, capital market equilibrium requires 
that saving in each period equals to accumulated capital in the following period. Capital 


























  (17) 
 
where, superscripts A and B denote regions.   
 
  To close the dynamic model, international labor market equilibrium must be 
specified. For simplicity, I assume that there is perfect international labor mobility.
15 
International labor market equilibrium requires  
 
   11 1 1 11
A B AA B
t t tt tt NN N N          .
B
                                                
 (18) 
 
15 A recent study by National Research Council shows that total stock of migrants increased 
quite dramatically in late 1980s and early 1990s (see National Research Council, 2000, 
pp. 157–59). In addition, in my model one period corresponds to 30 years, which makes 
perfect labor mobility a viable assumption.  
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where,   are the population growth rates in region A and region B, respectively. 





t 1 1   and      
16 This implies that net-of-tax wage rates are equalized in equilibrium. 




11 1 1 11 t 1 1 11
AA A A BB B
tt t t tt t wh wh            .  
                                                
 (19) 
 
It is assumed that only the members of the young generation moves between regions. 
Both regions are assumed to have “uniform” ability distributions, which mean that migration 
does not have any effect on the ability distribution in these regions.
17  
 
The model incorporates the interaction of household behavior, firm behavior, political 
process, and international labor flows. In the model explained above, a decrease in the 
population growth rate can affect labor flows and capital accumulation in two ways. First, it 
can affect “directly” by causing fewer workers in the economy, which leads to higher 
marginal product of labor, and thereby inducing labor inflows, ceteris paribus. Second, it can 
also affect “indirectly” through endogenous fiscal policy by changing the identity of the 
median voter. As a result of the aging trend, median voter becomes a lower ability person that 
votes for a lower tax rate. 
 
III.   GLOBAL AGING AND LABOR MIGRATION 
 
A.   Population Projections and Simulation Description 
  Simulations in this section are based on the population projections for developed and 
developing countries derived from the 2002 revision of the “World Population Prospects” 
published by the United Nations (United Nations, 2002a). The two world regions consist of 
28 developed and 141 developing countries. The list of these developed and developing 
countries are given in Appendix Table 1 and the population growth rates implied by the 
projections are shown in Figure 1. The simulations will be shown for two 30-year periods, 
2000–30 and 2030–60 and for the entire period 2000–60. The average population growth 
rates for the 1970–2000 period are used as a starting point. The population growth rate in 
developed countries decrease from an initial annual average rate of 0.8 percent to 
 
16Under a source system, labor income is taxed where income is earned. The model tax 
treaties of the OECD and the United Nations both give source countries the first rights to tax 
income accrued within their borders.  
17 A more realistic case is allowing for migration of workers that have certain abilities 
(unskilled vs. skilled). However, this would conflict with the uniform ability distribution 
which assumes that ability levels in the distribution are chosen at random. 
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0.67 percent for the 2000–2030 period and then to 0.38 percent for the 2030–60 period. In 
developing countries, this rate goes down from an initial annual average rate of 2.47 percent 
to 1.39 percent for the 2000–30 period and then to 1.27 percent for the 2030–2060 period.  
 
  The elasticity of output with respect to capital input is set equal to one-third 
( ). 0.33 
18 The annual rate of time preference is chosen to be 4 percent.
19 The two 
parameters, the rate of time preference in the utility specification and the population growth 
rate, are adjusted to the length of the model period (30 years). In the simulations, the ability 
level, a, is assumed to be distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1].  
 
  As mentioned in section 2, social security spending (
s
t g ) is exogenously set in the 
model. For simulations, social security expenditure for the developed and developing 
economies is compiled for the year 2000 using Government Finance Statistics by 
International Monetary Fund (2003). For simplicity, social security spending is assumed to 
grow in the future by the growth rate in population aged 65 and over. The United Nations 
population projections mentioned above enabled the derivation of social security spending 
for the periods 2000–30 and 2030–60. 
 
  A critical parameter in the model is the elasticity of human capital with respect to 
government spending on education and ability level (). Laitner (2000b) used a human 
capital function that is similar to (4) and set his human capital elasticity with respect to 
education equal to 0.1967. Based on an initial value of the ability of the median voter, 
Laitner’s estimate corresponds approximately to  0.4    in our model. However, a study by 
Psacharopoulos (1985) estimated a significantly higher rate of return to education for low 
income and developing countries compared to developed countries. Hence,   = 0.5 is 
chosen as a compromise given Laitner’s estimate and the large group of developing countries 




                                                 
18 This elasticity estimate is consistent with the data from the United States. See Laitner 
(2000a) for an argument.  
19 Caldwell, Favreault, Gantman, Gokhale, Johnson, and Kotlikoff (1999) argue that a 
premium of riskiness should be added to the widely used 2 percent rate. They use 3.5 percent 
as the discount rate which is the real safe return on indexed Treasury bonds. See Coronado, 
Fullerton and Glass (2000) for a recent argument on the variety of discount rates used in 
studies of social security. They assert that the selection of discount rates ranges between 2 to 
5 percent.  
20 See Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun (2004) for a sensitivity analysis on this parameter. 
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B.   Full Labor Mobility Simulation Results 
  In line with the model presented in section II, the full labor mobility simulation has 
perfect international labor mobility with migrant labor participating in the political system. 
Based on the population projections mentioned above, labor migrates from the developing 
region to the developed region. Figures 2 and 4 show this in reference to the change in the 
number of workers in both regions. Figure 2 shows that immigration of labor is a major 
component of the growth in the number of workers in developed countries. Labor 
immigration makes up 46 percent of the 41.1 percent growth between 2000 and 2030, and 61 
percent of the 40 percent growth between 2030 and 2060. It accounts for more than half (56 
percent) of the labor growth in developed countries between 2000 and 2060. Figure 3 shows 
how large the immigrant labor is relative to developed region population in 2000. 
Simulations here show that developed region receives increasing number of migrant labor 
through 2000–30 and 2030–60 periods. Overall, developed region receives 29 percent of its 
2000 population between 2000 and 2060. This also amounts to 48 percent of its working-age 
population. 
 
  On the other hand, developing countries send labor to the developed region and thus 
experience lower domestic labor growth. However, Figure 4 shows that this loss in labor 
growth is still a relatively small portion of the overall labor growth. For example, out of the 
51.3 percent labor growth that would have been seen in the developing region between 2000 
and 2030, 11.5 percent was lost due to out-migration of labor leaving this region with a net 
40 percent growth. 
 
  Figure 5 shows that this labor movement leads to opposite changes in capital stock 
per worker in developed and developing regions between 2000 and 2030. The influx of labor 
into the developed region does not translate into capital growth in that period since capital 
stock is determined by saving in the previous period (1970–2000), leading to a decrease in 
that period’s capital stock per worker. Developing region experiences a significant rise in the 
capital stock per worker since the capital stock in the period 2000–2030 is utilized by fewer 
workers. The contribution of new labor to the growth in the developed region shows itself in 
the next period with a modest 4.2 percent growth in capital stock per worker. While the 
developing region still exhibits a strong growth in capital stock per worker between 2030 and 
2060, this is significantly smaller than the growth recorded between 2000 and 2030. This is 
mainly due to considerable population growth decrease (from 2.47 percent to 1.39 percent) in 
developing countries coupled with labor emigration between 2000 and 2030 leading to 
significant saving per worker and capital per worker increases. While this population loss 
gave an initial boost to the developing region in 2000–30, it eventually showed itself in lower 
capital growth in 2030–2060 period. The outlook for the sixty year period from 2000 to 2060 
shows a small overall decline in capital stock per worker in the developed region but a strong 
increase in the developing region.  
 
  The other important component of growth is the human capital accumulation. As 
shown in equations (4) and (12), human capital is a function of the government spending on 
education. Changes in human capital are shown first in Figure 6, which is followed by 
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figures that show changes in the education tax rate and education spending. Figure 6 shows 
that the developed region fares much better in human capital worker between 2000 and 2030 
with a 7.8 percent growth. This is mainly due to migrant labor offsetting the negative effect 
of a decrease in the median voter ability, which would mean lower support for education 
spending, caused by aging. On the other hand, the developing region suffers from losing 
labor to the developed world by having a slight decrease in the human capital per worker 
between 2000 and 2030. As the labor growth falls by about ten percentage points in the 
developed region between 2030 and 2060, human capital per worker also drops. The 
decrease in the labor growth in the developing region in the same period is significantly 
smaller compared to the developed region.  In addition, as shown in Figure 8, education 
spending recovers in the developing region between 2030 and 2060, leading to increases in 
human capital per worker. Nevertheless, both regions experience an overall growth in human 
capital per worker during the 2000–60 period.  
 
  As mentioned above, the link between labor growth and human capital can be 
understood better with an examination of the changes in the education tax rate and education 
spending. These are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively. As discussed in the 
political process of fiscal policy, aging causes median voter to become a lower ability person 
putting a downward pressure on the education tax rate. However, labor migration offsets this 
negative effect by increasing the number of young voters. The migrant workers do not only 
contribute to domestic production but they also participate in the political system by voting 
for fiscal policy decisions. Since they are young, they change the political scene in favor of 
the young generation. Thus, with labor migration the choice of the tax rate changes in favor 
of the young voters despite the aging trend. Figure 7 shows this for the developed region 
between 2000 and 2030. The education tax rate increases considerably in the developed 
region while it falls quite dramatically in the developing region. However, the education tax 
rate decreases in the developed region in the following period as labor growth diminishes. 
The developed region experiences an overall increase in the education tax rate between 2000 
and 2060 while the developing region records a significant decrease.
21 Changes in education 
spending in Figure 8 closely match the tax rate changes in Figure 7 and the human capital 
changes in Figure 6. However, education spending in the developing region increases 
between 2030 and 2060 and between 2000 and 2060 despite the tax rate decreases in these 
periods. This is mainly due to income growth in this region (examined below) that outweighs 
the education tax rate decreases.  
 
                                                 
21 The results for the social security tax are not shown here but the rates do not change 
significantly across the periods mainly due to a fairly stable social security spending per 
young. Social security spending is forecasted outside the model and social security tax rate is 
driven only by income changes.   
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  Results in Figure 5 and 6 for capital per worker and human capital per worker provide 
a good background for examining changes in income per worker. Figure 9 shows that both 
developed and developing regions exhibit income growth between 2000 and 2030. While 
strong growth in human capital per worker in the developed region barely dominates a 
decrease in the capital stock per worker, considerable increase in the capital per worker in the 
developing region generates a much stronger income growth in this region. The developed 
region suffers from a decrease in human capital in the following period that leads to a 
decrease in income per worker. This region exhibits an overall decrease in income per 
worker for the entire period. On the other hand, the developing region benefits from growth 
in both capital per worker and human capital per worker, which leads to an income growth in 
all periods considered. 
 
  In addition to income per worker, consumption as a measure of welfare is examined 
in Figures 10 through 12. Figure 10 presents the change in the consumption of young in 
developed and developing regions. As shown in equation 7, consumption of a person when 
young depends on the net labor earnings. As also seen in equation 19, perfect labor mobility 
dictates that the net labor earning of a young worker gets equalized between the two regions. 
Since labor flows from the developing to the developed region, net labor earnings must have 
gone up in the developing region and it must have gone down in the developed region. This 
would increase consumption of young in the developing region and decrease it in the 
developed region. This is seen clearly in Figure 10. Since labor migration to the developed 
region occurs in both 2000-2030 and 2030-2060 periods, the same consumption pattern is 
observed in both periods and in the entire period from 2000 to 2060. 
 
  Old-age consumption, different from the young-age consumption, also depends on the 
net return on saving. The increase in the capital per worker in the developing region shown in 
Figure 5 depresses the interest rate in this region, leading to a decrease in the net return on 
saving. Figure 11 shows that this leads to a decrease in the old-age consumption between 
2000 and 2030. The developed region experiences the opposite and has an increase in the 
old-age consumption in that period. In the following period, the old-age consumption in the 
developing region (developed region) increases (decreases) due to an increase (decrease) in 
the net saving income. However, the old-age consumption decreases in both regions for the 
entire period. 
 
  Figure 12, brings the results shown in Figure 10 and 11 together and show changes in 
the sum of consumptions, in a given period, of representative persons from young and old 
generations. The figure shows that the developing region experiences an increase in the sum 
of consumptions between 2030 and 2060 and for the entire period from 2000 to 2060. 
However, the developed region has an increase in the sum of consumptions only between 
2000 and 2030. It has a slight overall decrease between 2000 and 2060. Finally, it is also 
possible to get a sum of the developed and developing region consumptions to see the change 
in the “world” consumption. While this is not explicitly shown in Figure 12, the growth in 
the sum of consumptions in the developing region dominates and the world consumption 
decreases only slightly between 2000 and 2030 but increases between 2030 and 2060 and 
between 2000 and 2060. 
  13 
C.   Model Comparisons and Labor Mobility Scenarios 
  In this section, full labor mobility model is compared to an alternative open economy 
model where capital is internationally mobile without international labor mobility. Further 
comparisons are also made using alternative assumptions about labor mobility and the 
political process of fiscal policy. The goal is to shed light on the choice of factor mobility in 
the presence of population aging. Table 2 presents simulation results for these comparisons. 
Results shown in Figure 2 and Figure 4 through 12 are reproduced in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 2.  
 
  Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show that the capital mobility model produces 
significantly inferior outcomes for the developed region, in terms of the economic variables 
used in the analysis, compared to the full labor mobility model. It appears that labor flows to 
the developed region offset the adverse effect of population aging particularly on the human 
capital per worker. As explained earlier, migrant workers participate in the political process 
of fiscal policy by voting favorably for the education tax, leading to enhanced education 
spending and human capital in the developed region. The developing region exhibits strong 
capital and income growth throughout the periods under both full labor mobility and capital 
mobility (without labor mobility) models. In the capital mobility model without labor 
mobility, the developing region does not lose labor to the developed region and benefits from 
the inflow of capital from the developed region. In this model, capital inflows to the 
developing region enable this region to increase investment, production and income while at 
the same time retaining its young productive workers, voters and human capital. Thus, the 
capital mobility model (without labor mobility) produces more favorable results for the 
developing region compared to the full labor mobility model. 
 
  The next set of comparisons is between the full labor mobility model and variants of 
this model shown in columns (5) through (10) in Table 2. The first is the case where labor 
mobility is only allowed after 2030. This scenario considers the possibility that doors remain 
closed in the developed region until aging becomes an even bigger problem in the developed 
region.
22 The results for this scenario in column (5) show that the developed region may fare 
slightly better particularly after 2030 if labor flow is delayed until 2030. This is mainly due 
to lower overall labor growth in the developed region. With this relatively low labor growth 
net return on labor does not decrease as much as in the full labor mobility model in 
column (1) leading to slightly better capital, human capital, income and consumption results.  
  
The next scenario allows for free labor mobility but puts a constraint on the political 
participation of migrant labor in the developed region for the first period. This simulates an 
extended delay in the naturalization of foreign workers into the political system of a country. 
After a thirty-year delay, workers eventually become citizens with eligibility to vote. 
                                                 
22 For example, in the U.S., the effect of the baby boom generation retirement will not be 
seen for another decade. 
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Column (7) shows that this scenario produces rather adverse outcomes for the developed 
region. These are mostly driven by sharp decreases in education tax rate, education spending 
and human capital per worker and show a strong contrast with results in column (1). With 
aging in the developed region, lack of young migrant votes for the education tax rate leads to 
a decrease in this tax rate such that net labor earning differential between the regions can 
only be closed by a greater flow of labor from the developing to the developed region.
23 This 
is the reason behind the interesting result of substantially high labor growth in the developed 
region. The results for the developing region in column (8) are quite similar to the ones in 
column (2) with slightly inferior results in the labor mobility model with delayed migrant 
voting. 
 
  Finally, the full labor mobility model is compared to an alternative model where 
education tax and spending are not determined through a political process but instead 
determined exogenously by the government. It is assumed here that the government fixes the 
education spending per worker. Results for the developed region in column (9) show that the 
direction of the income changes for 2000–30 and 2030–60 is reversed under this alternative 
model. Since there is no human capital feedback under this scenario, decreases in capital per 
worker between 2000 and 2030 decreases income per worker. However, as column (1) 
indicated, it is the human capital increase that leads to an increase in income per worker in 
this period under the labor mobility model. In addition, the labor mobility model in 
column (1) gives better consumption results (particularly the sum of young and old 
consumption) than the ones in column (9). Results for the developing region in column (10) 
show that the direction of changes in economic variables does not differ from the labor 
mobility model results in column (2). There are only slight changes in growth magnitudes. 
 
D.   Discussion 
  The simulation results presented show that the full labor mobility model is generally 
superior to other alternative models considered. Due to the perfect international labor 
mobility assumption, labor inflows to developed countries implied by these results may be 
high by historical standards. To get a feel for the magnitude of these labor inflows, actual 
inflows of foreign population to developed countries are compared to labor inflows predicted 
by the full labor mobility model. Table 3 presents this comparison using the simulation 
results in Figure 3 for the predicted labor inflows and actual foreign population inflows as 
reported by the OECD in 2000. The second row shows that predicted average annual number 
of labor migrants is fairly close to actual inflows of foreign population. It is even below the 
actual figure for the 2000-2030 period. OECD distinguishes between foreign population 
inflows and foreign worker inflows. The third row in Table 3 shows the same ratio for the 
foreign worker inflows. In this case, the predicted average annual number of labor migrants 
is almost double the actual foreign worker inflows in 2000 for the 2000–30 period, and it is 
                                                 
23 While not shown in Table 2, the decrease in the education tax rate is also balanced by a 
sharp increase in the social security tax rate. 
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about 2.7 times greater for the 2030–60 period. While the difference in this second 
comparison is fairly large, the predicted flows may well be consistent with dramatic 
population growth decreases expected in the developed countries in the next sixty years.  
 
  Another issue that may be important in the interpretation of paper’s results is that the 
benefits of labor inflows may be undermined by substantial transfers (other than education) 
to these migrants within the welfare system of developed countries. While such transfers are 
not modeled in the paper, it is not certain how this would change the results presented in this 
paper. First, welfare transfers would be important if the magnitude of the labor inflows is 
indeed large. The comparison of predicted to actual foreign population inflows discussed 
above tells us that this magnitude may not necessarily be different from current actual 
inflows. Second, one can also imagine labor migrants in developed countries voting for lower 
transfers (mainly social security) or lower social security taxes when they participate in the 
political system. Hence, this would put a counter pressure on welfare transfers. This paper 
focused only on the political economy of aging and education spending in order to highlight 
the importance of this link and also to attain simplicity in using the median voter model 
within the growth model.
24  
 
  Finally, simulation results may be sensitive to a key parameter ( ) in the model, 
which indicates the return to human capital from the ability level and education spending. A 
closed economy study by Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun (2004) showed that low values of 
this parameter (mainly  <0.34) produced immiserizing steady state growth results. It was 
argued earlier in section B that the literature on returns to education pointed to relatively 
higher parameter estimates particularly for developing countries. Hence, such low   values 
wouldn’t be anticipated in a two-region world with developed and developing countries. In a 




IV.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the economic effects of aging trends using the population 
projections for the developed and developing regions of the world. Unlike the majority of 
studies on aging, the paper addresses the political economy of aging and education spending 
through a median voter model. While there is a growing literature that examines the link 
between population aging and international capital mobility, population aging has not been 
                                                 
24 Poutvaara (2004) recently addressed the political economy of both education and social 
security in an overlapping generations model. However, that study does not examine 
population aging. 
25 Results for this simulation are not reported in this paper but available from the author upon 
request. 
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widely addressed in an open economy framework with international labor mobility. The 
paper fills this gap by modeling perfect international labor mobility. 
 
It is argued that labor mobility has a dual effect on the economy. Besides the 
contribution of young migrant workers to the economy as laborers, these workers also 
contribute to capital accumulation as savers. This paper highlights another effect through 
migrant workers’ involvement in the political process of fiscal policy. When allowed to vote, 
migrant workers change the political structure composed of young and elderly voters in both 
labor-receiving and labor-sending countries. In a majority voting mechanism for fiscal policy 
decisions, political shifts resulting from labor migration may have sizeable impacts on 
government programs such as education, and in turn may have strong growth and welfare 
effects. 
 
For the analysis, a two-region, two-period overlapping generations model with 
international labor mobility and a politically responsive fiscal policy is used. The numerical 
simulations based on United Nations population projections for the developed and 
developing regions show significant labor movements from the developed to the developing 
region throughout the 2000–60 period. While labor inflows seem to help the developed 
region recover from the aging trend, this region incurs an overall decrease in income per 
worker and consumption. Nevertheless, a comparison with an alternative capital mobility 
model without labor mobility indeed shows the importance of migrant labor and their 
political participation. The developed region suffers from substantial income and 
consumption decreases under this capital mobility model, which is averted, to a large extent, 
in the labor mobility model. The developing region, on the other hand, seems to benefit more 
in the capital mobility model. However, this region experiences significant growth under 
both models. These comparisons show that the choice between labor and capital mobility 
indeed matters for the analysis of the effects of population aging. 
 
Further comparisons are also made using alternative assumptions about labor mobility 
and the political process of fiscal policy. The full labor mobility model performed quite well 
particularly when it is compared to a scenario where labor migrates to the developed region 
but does not participate in the political system for the first thirty-year period. This scenario 
gives particularly inferior economic results for the developed region. Constraining political 
participation of young migrant workers does not seem to help when these young workers can 
vote for greater education spending that sets a growth process through human capital 
enhancement. 
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Migrant Stock in 
2000 (Percent of 
Total Population) 1/ 
 
Net Migration 
(Rate per 1000 
Population) 
(1995–2000) 2/ 
        
Average of 23 high income OECD 









        
Three high income OECD countries 









        
Three high income OECD countries 









        
Less developed regions (UN definition) 9.09   122  5.27  -0.67 
        
Least developed countries (UN  










Sources: International migration data is from United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International 
Migration, 2002 (United Nations, 2002b). Education spending data is from World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2003 CD-ROM 
(World Bank, 2003). 
1/ Migrant stock: For most countries, the mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country. For countries lacking 
data on place of birth, the estimated number of noncitizens. In both cases, migrant stock also includes refugees, some of whom may not be 
foreign-born. 
2/ Net migration rate: The net number of migrants (annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens 
and noncitizens), divided by the average population of the receiving country. It is expressed as the net number of migrants per 1,000 
population. 
3/ These are Luxemboutg (9.4), Australia (5.1), and Ireland (4.9). 
4/ These are Iceland( 0.2), Japan (0.4), and Switzerland (0.6). 
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Table 2. Comparisons with Alternative Factor Mobility Models 1/ 
 
    Labor Mobility Model 
(No Capital Mobility) 
 Capital  Mobility  Model 
(No Labor Mobility) 








 Time  Periods  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
            
Number of workers  2000–2030  41.1  39.8    22.2  51.3 
 2030–2060  30.9  34.4    12.0  46.0 
 2000–2060  84.7  87.8    36.9  121.0 
            
Capital stock per worker  2000–2030  -10.0  48.7    -35.5  80.5 
 2030–2060  4.2  23.7    -6.7  16.1 
 2000–2060  -6.2  84.0    -39.8  109.5 
            
Human capital per worker  2000–2030  7.8  -1.2    -18.2  11.2 
 2030–2060  -6.3  3.8    -24.5  3.2 
 2000–2060  1.0  2.6    -38.2  14.8 
            
Income per worker  2000–2030  1.6  13.1    -24.3  30.5 
 2030–2060  -2.9  10.0    -19.0  7.3 
 2000–2060  -1.4  24.4    -38.7  40.0 
            
Education tax rate  2000–2030  18.5  -14.1    -19.0  -1.4 
 2030–2060  -11.8  -0.4    -44.4  0.4 
 2000–2060  4.5  -14.5    -55.0  -1.1 
            
Education spending per  











 2030–2060  -14.7  9.6    -54.8  7.7 
 2000–2060  2.6  6.5    -72.3  38.5 
            
Consumption of young  2000–2030  -3.2  18.9    -23.2  31.3 
 2030–2060  -0.5  10.2    -13.8  7.2 
 2000–2060  -3.7  31.1    -33.7  40.8 
            
Consumption of old  2000–2030  5.4  -16.3    14.0  -22.2 
 2030–2060  -6.5  8.9    27.6  23.7 
 2000–2060  -1.4  -8.9    -17.5  -3.7 
            
Sum of young and old 











 2030–2060  -3.8  9.5    -22.4  15.4 
 2000–2060  -2.5  6.2    -25.1  13.1 
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Table 2. Comparisons with Alternative Factor Mobility Models 1/ (concluded) 
 
    Labor Mobility Model 
with Mobility 
After 2030 
(No Capital Mobility) 
  Labor Mobility Model 
with Migrants Voting 
After 2030 
(No Capital Mobility) 
  Labor Mobility Model 
with Fixed Education 
Spending per Worker 






















               
Number of workers  2000–2030  22.2  51.3    76.2  18.3    53.7  32.1 
 2030–2060  32.9  35.7    27.2  32.3    20.9  39.7 
 2000–2060  62.4  105.4    124.1  56.5    85.8  84.5 
                  
Capital stock per worker  2000–2030  3.9  37.4    -27.9  75.7    -17.4  57.5 
 2030–2060  -9.5  28.4    -11.7  4.6    15.8  15.4 
 2000–2060  06.0  76.4    -36.4  83.9    -4.3  81.7 
                  
Human capital per worker  2000–2030  -8.4  0-.9    -47.2  -27.7    0.0  0.0 
 2030–2060  12.6  1.2    40.6  39.9    0.0  0.0 
 2000–2060  3.1  2.1    -25.8  1.1    0.0  0.0 
                  
Income per worker  2000–2030  -4.5  11.7    -41.5  -3.1    -6.1  16.2 
 2030–2060  4.7  9.5    20.6  27.1    5.0  4.8 
 2000–2060  0.0  22.3    -29.5  23.2    -1.4  21.8 
                  
Education tax rate  2000–2030  -16.3  -8.6    -81.5  -56.5    6.7  -13.8 
 2030–2060  29.5  -6.1    236.4  91.5    1.7  -17.8 
 2000–2060  8.4  -14.1    -37.6  -16.7    1.7  -17.8 
                  
Education spending per  















 2030–2060  35.3  2.9    310.9  144.0    0.0  0.0 
 2000–2060  8.0  5.1    -56.2  2.7    0.0  0.0 
                  
Consumption of young  2000–2030  -1.6  15.1    -36.3  17.0    -8.9  22.1 
 2030–2060  -1.5  11.7    12.3  11.8    6.3  6.3 
 2000–2060  -3.0  28.6    -28.4  30.8    -3.1  29.9 
                  
Consumption of old  2000–2030  -3.9  -13.2    -8.4  -27.2    7.4  -18.2 
 2030–2060  4.7  3.4    -24.1  22.9    -14.4  14.7 
 2000–2060  0.6  -10.2    -30.5  -10.5    -8.1  -6.2 
                  
Sum of young and old 















 2030–2060  1.8  7.1    -10.2  17.4    -5.5  10.7 
 2000–2060  -1.1  4.5    -29.5  5.1    -5.8  7.4 
 
Source: Computed by author. 
1/ All numbers refer to percentage changes between the years indicated in the time period. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Predicted and Actual Labor Flows to Developed Region 
 
  2000–2030 2030–2060 
    
Predicted average annual number of labor migrants to developed region.    3,256,141    4,580,496 
    
Ratio of predicted average annual number of labor migrants to actual foreign  





    
Ratio of predicted average annual number of labor migrants to actual foreign  






Source: The figures in the first row are derived from simulations shown in Figure 3 for the developed region. Statistics on foreign population 
inflows and foreign worker inflows are from Trends in International Migration, OECD, 2002 edition. Tables A.1.1 and A.2.1 are accessed 
online at http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,2340,en_2825_494553_2515108_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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Figure 5
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Figure 7
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   evaluated at the initial steady state.  Finally 
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Appendix Table 1: List of Countries Used in Population Projections 
 
Developed Countries     Developing Countries 
Australia   Afghanistan Gambia  Panama 
Austria    Albania  Ghana  Papua New Guinea 
Belgium   Algeria  Guatemala  Paraguay 
Canada   Angola  Guinea  Peru 
Cyprus   Azerbaijan  Guyana  Philippines 
Denmark   Argentina  Haiti  Poland 
Finland   Bahamas  Honduras  Guinea-Bissau 
France   Bahrain  Hungary  Qatar 
Germany   Bangladesh  India  Romania 
Greece   Armenia  Indonesia  Russian  Federation 
China,Hong Kong SAR    Barbados  Iran (Islamic Republic of)  Rwanda 
Iceland   Bhutan  Iraq  Saint  Lucia 
Ireland    Bolivia  Côte d'Ivoire  Saint Vincent and Grenadines
Israel    Botswana  Jamaica  Sao Tome and Principe 
Italy   Brazil  Kazakhstan  Saudi  Arabia 
Japan   Belize  Jordan  Senegal 
Republic of Korea    Solomon Islands  Kenya  Sierra Leone 
Luxembourg   Bulgaria  Kuwait  Slovakia 
Netherlands   Myanmar  Kyrgyzstan  Viet  Nam 
New Zealand    Burundi  Lao People's Dem.Rep.  Slovenia 
Norway   Belarus  Lebanon  Somalia 
Portugal   Cambodia  Lesotho  South  Africa 
Singapore   Cameroon  Latvia  Zimbabwe 
Spain    Cape Verde  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  Sudan 
Sweden   Central  African  Rep. Lithuania  Suriname 
Switzerland   Sri  Lanka  Madagascar  Swaziland 
United Kingdom    Chad  Malawi  Syrian Arab Republic 
U.S.A.   Chile  Malaysia  Tajikistan 
   China  Maldives  Thailand 
   Colombia  Mali  Togo 
   Comoros  Malta  Tonga 
    Congo  Mauritania  Trinidad and Tobago 
    Dem.Rep.of the Congo  Mauritius  United Arab Emirates 
   Costa  Rica  Mexico Tunisia 
   Croatia  Mongolia  Turkey 
    Czech Republic  Republic of Moldova  Turkmenistan 
   Benin  Morocco  Uganda 
   Dominican  Republic  Mozambique  Ukraine 
   Ecuador  Oman  Egypt 
    El Salvador  Namibia  United Republic of Tanzania 
    Equatorial Guinea  Nepal  Burkina Faso 
   Ethiopia  Netherlands  Antilles  Uruguay 
   Estonia  Vanuatu Uzbekistan 
   Fiji  Nicaragua  Venezuela 
   Djibouti  Niger  Samoa 
   Gabon  Nigeria Yemen 
   Georgia  Pakistan  Zambia 
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